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Abstract:  On October 2016 the South Korean cyber military unit was the victim of a
successful cyber attack that allowed access to internal networks. Per usual with large
scale  attacks  against  South  Korean entities,  the  hack  was  immediately  attributed to
North  Korea.  Also,  per  other  large-scale  cyber  security  incidents,  the  same types  of
‘evidence’ were used for attribution purposes. Disclosed methods of attribution provide
weak  evidence,  and  the  procedure  Korean organizations  tend to  use  for  information
disclosure lead many to question any conclusions. We will analyze and discuss a number
of  issues with the current way that South Korean organizations disclose cyber attack
information to the public. A time line of events and disclosures will be constructed and
analyzed  in  the  context  of  appropriate  measures  for  cyber  warfare.  Finally,  we  will
examine  the  South  Korean  cyber  military  attack  in  terms previously  proposed cyber
warfare response guidelines. Specifcally, whether any of the guidelines can be applied to
this real-world case, and if so, is South Korea justifed in declaring war based on the most
recent cyber attack.
Keywords: Cyber military, cyber warfare, South Korea, Tallinn Manual, cyber response,
national security
1. Introduction
On  a  theoretical  level  cybercrime  and  cyberwarfare  are  quite  diferent.  Each  have
diferent motivations and potential consequences. However, the methods used by both
cyber  criminals  and  government-sponsored  attackers  are  -  in  most  cases  -  nearly
indistinguishable. Although there is currently much discussion about cyber warfare and
appropriate  or  justifed response,  it  is  unclear  how to  apply  even the  most  practical
recommendations. This work gives a case example of a recent cyber attack against the
South  Korean military  cyber  unit,  and analyzes Korea’s  response options  in  terms of
cyber-conflict guides vs. reality.
South Korea has a 92.1% Internet penetration rate (“Asia Internet Usage Stats”, 2016).
Most  banking  and  government  services  are  ofered  online,  and  online  shopping  is
extremely  common.  Likewise,  credit  cards  and  other  virtual  currencies  are  common
throughout the country.
Korea’s cyber security policy is largely based on isolationism and obscurity.  Influence
from such policies is  seen in the well-meaning Digital  Signature Act (1999).  This  Act
mandated centralized cybersecurity practices for online banking and ecommerce on the
provider and client sides, implemented in mandatory, government-controlled software.
The policy continues to force the use of (no longer supported) browsers and browser
plugins  for  conducting  basic  transactions  online.  Until  a  2014  revision  of  the  Act,
alternative software using current cyber security best practices was prohibited.  As of
2017, much online commerce and government online services in South Korea continue to
require end-of-support software on the client side.
Although South Korea is seen as a highly-connected, technologically advanced country,
policies  such  as  these  have  stunted  Korea’s  development  in  practical  information
security. The government is slow to change, especially after providing complete backing
for an already implemented system. Further, the current system is extremely useful for
law enforcement and intelligence services during investigations. Allowing a free market
on information security practices would reduce direct access from the government.
These issues are not meant to be a criticism per se, but to give background context on
the state of thinking behind cyber security decisions. Because of a national security focus
on internal threats rather than external threats (“National Security Act”, 2011), there is
little motivation for security-focused change based on external pressures.
This situation is made worse because of alleged cyber conflicts between North and South
Korea. There have been many cyber attacks against South Korean infrastructure in the
past, which will be discussed later. Out of these attacks the South Korean government
claimed that North Korea is behind all  major incidents. However, evidence implicating
North Korea is often circumstantial.  Key evidence that allegedly proves North Korea’s
involvement is consistently classifed as secret, and is never released to the public. This
is similar to the FBI discussing evidence the Sony Pictures hacking case of 2014, also
allegedly involving North Korea.
In  this  work,  we  examine  major  cyber  attacks  against  South  Korean  organizations,
specifcally focusing on the 2016 attack on South Korea’s cyber military unit; the ‘Cyber
Command’. The Korean Cyber Command revealed that their anti-virus relay servers were
compromised on October 5th 2016, allegedly by North Korea. Confdential  documents
were exfltrated during the attack (Kim, 2016).
2. Background
The Cyber Command was created under the Korean Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on
January 1, 2010 in response to the 7.7DDOS (July 1, 2009) attack allegedly committed by
North Korea. In September 2011, the Cyber Command came under the control of the
Korean Ministry of National Defense which is in charge of the command and control of the
Korean Armed Forces. Currently, there are an estimated 1,000 soldiers under the Cyber
Command. The cyber command is divided into 4 primary units (publicly). There are:
 Research and Development (Corps 31)
 Cyber warfare (Corps 510)
 Psychological warfare (Corps 530)
 Education and Training (Corps 590)
The organization structure of the cyber command is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: South Korean Cyber Command organizational structure. Stevenh. 
(2016) South Korean cyberwarfare unit for cyberwar. [사이버전(戰)을 위한 남북한
‘사이버전 전담부대’] . Available at: http://ko.stevenh.wikidok.net/wp-
d/585b33ef6926962302f059a  [Accessed January 27, 2017].
2.1 Major attacks against South Korea
South Korean government agencies, businesses and critical infrastructure have been the
victims of many large scale cyber attacks. On July 4, 2009, DDOS attacks were launched
against major sites in the United States (Lee, 2009). On July 7, the attacks began to
target  major  sites  in  South  Korea.  The  attack  took  websites,  including  government
websites, ofine for up to 4 hours. The White House and major sites in the US, and South
Korean websites of Media companies, political parties, the National Intelligence Service
(NIS) and other major portal sites were targeted (Internet News Team, 2009). The NIS
announced that it was most likely North Korean sponsored hacker groups. However, there
was not enough direct evidence to conclusively link to North Korea. On October 30, 2009,
during an audit with the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee the NIS chief
stated  that  the  IP  coordinating  the  attack  was  allocated  to  China.  North  Korea’s
telecommunication ministry was known to lease this IP from Chinese providers. Based on
the evidence, North Korea was identifed as the primary suspect in the 7.7 DDOS attack,
a claim that North Korea denies (Kim, 2009).
“DarkSeoul” was a large-scale cyber terror attack that disabled the computer equipment
of broadcasters and fnancial institutions in South Korea on March 20, 2013. Malicious
code spread through the public to target critical  systems through the compromise of
popular Web servers. Popular sites were infected with drive-by malware (Kim, 2013). The
malicious code took control of the PC or server inside the institution for up to 8 months.
During  this  time  the  malware  exfltrated  data,  identifed  more  vulnerabilities,  and
distributed malicious code. On March 20th, the malware deleted data in infected PCs and
servers, all at the same time. At the time, more than 48,000 PCs were disabled. This
resulted  in  media  coverage  and  banking  outages  for  ten  days.  As  well  as  fnancial
damage  of  an  estimated  900  billion  Korean  Won  (approx.  900  million  USD)  (Special
Coverage Team, 2013).  The South Korean government was also quick to name North
Korea as the prime suspect. There are four main pieces of evidence that attributes the
attack to North Korea. Sung and Lee (2013) describe them as:
1. Traces of manipulating an infected PCs through the same Chinese IP address used
in previous attacks
2. Traces  of  a  Korean-language  PC  accessing  the  fnancial  companies  1590  times,
distributing malicious code and leaking data since June 28, 2012
3. Malicious code similar to the previous hacking in South Korea where North Korea
was suspected
4.  An attack route that was the same as previous hacking that was allegedly by North
Korea 
Finally,  on  December  15,  2014,  personal  information  of  Korea  Hydroelectric  Nuclear
Power Corporation (KHNP) staf members and confdential documents related to nuclear
power plants and nuclear power plants (including drawings of nuclear power plants) were
revealed on the hacker's' blog. The document contained the phrase "Who Am I?", and
stated that they were an anti-nuclear group (Lee, 2014). They also announced a second
attack during Christmas. The media claimed that the malicious code was similar to prior
cyber terror attack, and that the attackers used expressions mainly used in North Korea,
notifying the attack through Twitter (Jin, 2014). The hacker disclosed internal documents
related to the nuclear power plant on December 15, 18, 19, 21, and 24, and requested to
shut  down  Korea  nuclear  power  plants  Kori  1  and  3  and  Wolsong  2  starting  from
Christmas. The attackers threatened to reveal 10 million pages of unpublished data and
carry out the second attack if their demands were not met. On October 24, the South
Korean government announced that the KHNP' attack originated in Shenyang, China. On
March 17, 2015, Hanshin announced that the KHNP hacking attack was from a North
Korean hacker organization (Koo, 2015). The evidence stated was:
1. The malicious code is similar to the "kimsuky" malicious code allegedly used by a
North Korean hacker organization in a prior attack (not conclusively proven)
2.  The same Chinese IP address used previously that is believed to also be used by
North Korea 
2.2 Cyber Attack Against South Korean Cyber Military
After establishing the Defense Integrated Data Center (DIDC) in 2014, a private company
that built the computer network connected the internal computer system to the external
computer system in the process of building the computer network. They fnished the
work without disconnecting. Through this route, malicious code penetrated the military
network  for  the  frst  time  on  August  4,  2016.  On September  23,  Cyber  Command's
vaccine  routing  server  detected  signs  of  malicious  code  infection,  and  the  army
separated the network of vaccine routing servers on September 25, midnight, and set up
a joint investigation team on October 2 to investigate the infltration route, the damage
situation, and the identity of the hacker (Lee, 2016). 
On December 5,  a two-month investigation found that  there was an intrusion in the
intranet (defense network), and the possibility confdential documents were leaked. It
was  initially  claimed  that  the  frst  signs  of  infltration  were  found  on  the  Cyber
Command’s vaccine routing server, however it was revealed that on December 7, that
traces of intrusion were also found on the vaccine routing server in Gye-Ryong-Dae DIDC
(Defense Integrated Data Center). DIDC is the center for the information systems of the
Army, Navy and Air Force.
The center has an important role, and the total number of infected computers was 3,200.
2,500  systems  were  external  networks  (Internet  use),  700  were  internal  networks
(defense networks), and the defense minister's business computer was also infected with
malware. The military revealed that the hacker’s IP address was allocated to Shenyang,
China; again suspected of being used by the North Korean military. Malware code similar
to  prior  cases  were  also  found (North  Korea  suspected).  Also,  a  Hangul  (the  Korean
alphabet) keyboard was used for compiling the malicious code. With this evidence, the
military announced that North Korea was the likely suspect (Lee, 2016). On December 9,
North Korea denied the claim and argued, "자신들이 해킹한 것이라면 왜 계속 같은 주소대역대
의 IP 주소를 사용하겠냐” which translates as: If we hacked them, why would we continue
to use the IP address range? According to North Korea, blaming them was an attempt to
manipulate public opinion to divert from political issues in South Korea (Kim, 2016). On
December 12, the Ministry of National Defense announced that the Defense Commission
had leaked confdential data but could not disclose what kind of data it contained, and
could only reveal that it was not a serious document (Lee and Ryu, 2016). However, a
day later,  on December 13,  the military prosecutors and Defense Security Command
proceeded to carry out search and seizure.  It  was recently revealed that confdential
information was leaked. The investigation is still ongoing (Hong, 2016).
3. Appropriate Response from South Korea
The attack against the South Korea Cyber Command is an excellent case study to test
out theoretical recommendations for cyber warfare response. The attack was targeted
against  a  nation’s  military,  successfully  leaked  confdential  military  documents  and
evidence  leads  back  to  only  a  few  main  suspects  (though  none  proven  beyond
reasonable doubt). There is likely no cyber attack that has greater standing as a cyber
conflict, beyond two nations openly admitting their actions. We will analyze this case in
the context of the Tallinn Manual.
After North Korea was identifed to be the suspect behind several cyber attacks targeting
critical infrastructure, the people of South Korea started to consider cyber attacks as an
“act of war” and asked for “retribution” in both cyber and traditional forms (Yoo, 2013).
However, the issue is not as simple as people believe it  to be. Not only is there the
politics  between countries  to  consider,  but  also  the  legal  perspective.  Retribution  or
declaring war is a complex, often prohibited, procedure. Meanwhile, it is also reasonable
that a national crisis such as a severe cyber attack cannot continue to happen without
any deterrence. That is why the Tallinn Manual  garnered attention with the hopes of
having a strict guideline in the new domain of cyber warfare 
In  this  section,  we  will  attempt  to  establish  which  rules  of  the  Tallinn  Manual  could
potentially  apply to  cyber  attacks  similar  to  South Korea’s case.  This  section will  be
divided into the terms in which cyber attacks could be categorized, and what the victim
State would be entitled to do accordingly. 
3.1 Cyber operation as armed attack
The frst Rule we need to consider is when the cyber operation is an armed attack within
the meaning of the UN charter. Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual (Schmitt, 2013) attempts to
identify situations of legitimate self-defense. The right to exercise self-defense is not only
limited to kinetic attacks, but also can be justifed in case of cyber attacks (Rule 13, cmt.
3). Because of the term “armed” attack, however, the experts had varying opinions; it
was disputed if weapons were necessary for an “armed” attack (Rule 13, cmt. 4). The
majority of experts denied the necessity and were more inclined to set an analogy as to
determine the severity of the cyber attack (Rule 13, cmt. 4). For them, a cyber operation
could be considered as an armed attack if the consequences were equal to those of an
attack with a kinetic weapon (Rule 13, cmt. 4). The idea that cyber operations could be
sufficiently grave to qualify as armed attacks came to an accord unanimously (Rule 13,
cmt. 3). The Rule itself defnes armed attack as cyber operation depending on scale and
efects. Based on the Nicaragua judgment (Nicaragua v. United States of America 1986,
para. 191), the scales and efect are criteria to determine the “most grave forms” of use
of force (Rule 13, cmt. 6). To be more detailed, according to the International Group of
Experts, any use of force that “injures or kills persons or damages or destroys property”
(Rule  13,  cmt.  6)  would  be  enough  to  constitute  as  armed  attack.  A  more  precise
defnition of what exactly would be “grave” is not given. 
In the recent case of South Korea, this Rule cannot apply as comment 6 states “acts of
cyber  intelligence  gathering  and  cyber  theft,  cyber  operations  that  involve  brief  or
periodic interruption of non-essential  cyber services” are not considered to be armed
attacks (Rule 13, cmt. 6). 
3.2 Cyber operation as use of force
While use of force takes up an entire chapter of the Tallinn Manual, it is important to
diferentiate the terms “use of force” and “armed attack”. These two standards are to be
distinguished  as  they  serve  diferent  purposes  (Rule  11,  cmt.  11).  “Use  of  force”  is
defned with the simple goal to decide whether a State has violated the prohibition of the
use of force according to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945) and related
customary international laws (Rule 11, cmt. 11). “Armed attack”, on the other hand, gives
a State the right to defend itself with use of force (Rule 11, cmt. 11). Thus, any cyber
operation that does not constitute as an armed attack, the victim State must resort to
other methods, such as countermeasures in Rule 9 (Rule 11, cmt. 11). Responding in use
of force without receiving an armed attack would violate the prohibition.
Rule  11 again  uses  the  phrase  “scale  and efects”,  without  further  explanation.  The
comments make it clear the physical efects serve as a major criteria; States have denied
inclusion  of  economic  or  political  coercion  as  a  use  of  force,  so  mere  funding  of  a
hacktivist group would not qualify (Rule 11, cmt. 3). Giving an organized group malware
and training to use it to conduct cyber attacks against other States would be considered
use of  force (Rule 11, cmt.  4).  Despite this,  dealing with cyber operations without  a
kinetic equivalent is still unsettled. The experts provided a probable assessment with 8
factors to consider.  This,  however,  is also not defnitive; a holistic assessment of  the
operation  depending  on  the  various  circumstances  seems  to  be  unavoidable  (p.20,
Schmitt, 2012). 
3.3 State responsibility
This  is  a  Rule  that  determines  the  scope  of  responsibility  a  State  has  for  its  cyber
operation. Based on the customary international law of State responsibility, the State has
international legal responsibility if the act is attributable to it and the act constitutes as a
breach of an international obligation (Rule 6, cmt.2). Any cyber operations conducted by
organs of a State, which is understood as a broad term, including every person of entity
under the State’s internal legislation, can be attributed to the State (Rule 6, cmt.6). If the
organ appears to operate in official capacity and breach international obligations, the
State becomes responsible (Rule 6, cmt.7). Whether the organ acted “in compliance with,
beyond, or without any instructions” has little consequence (Rule 6, cmt.7). This is the
same for other entities empowered by domestic law to be equivalent to governmental
authority  (Rule  6,  cmt.8).  However,  standards  to  determine  how  much  evidence
“attributable”  needs  is  unsettled.  It  stands  to  question  if  suspecting  a  State  can be
enough or if it is even possible to attribute the questionable act to a State with absolute
certainty.  In  comment  14,  acts  can  be  retroactively  attributed  to  the  State  if  it
acknowledges or adopt the conduct. It is unlikely in case of the recent attack of South
Korea, that the North Korean government would admit to any involvement. 
Internationally  a  wrongful  act  can  refer  to  cyber  operations  that  are  violating
international law (Rule 6,  cmt.4).  In case of  cyber espionage, however,  this becomes
controversial as there is no international law prohibiting the act per se (Rule 6, cmt.4).
One  possible  interpretation  could  be  based  on  Rule  1  comment  6;  cyber  operation
directed  to  another  State’s  cyber  infrastructure  may  violate  the  latter’s  sovereignty.
However, whether malware is used for monitoring purposes only without causing physical
damage could be regarded as breach of sovereignty was disputed without consensus
(Rule 1, cmt. 6). It would depend on the severity and efects of the act to determine if
cyber espionage is an international wrongful act at all.
Even  if  it  is  considered  as  an  international  wrongful  act  thereby  justifying
countermeasures  in  context  of  Rule  9,  the  appropriate  responses  are  not  at  full
consensus. It is the widespread agreement that cyber countermeasures cannot include
the threat or use of force (Rule 11), however there are some who accept limited degree
of military force. In comment 7, the Experts foresee a “proportionate” countermeasure to
be appropriate, which is determined by the gravity of the initial unlawful act. If the origin
of the cyber breach is unclear, the State may invoke a plea of necessity (Rule 9 cmt. 12).
The State may be entitled to counter hacking, if the action is the “only way” to prevent
further attacks and does not violate interests of other States too severely (Rule 9 cmt.
12). The precise limits and scope of this plea is still debated.
3.4 Conclusion
The Tallinn Manual, despite giving a guideline, does not give sufficient material in certain
situations as stated in the scope section of the Introduction. However, even in dealing
with cyber operations addressed in the manual, it does not seem to give enough criteria
to  determine  the  appropriate  response  if  the  cyber  operation  does  not  accompany
physical consequences. Overall it can be concluded that terms used as standards are too
ambiguous to avoid subjective assessments.
One thing that needs to be mentioned specifc to South Korea’s situation with North
Korea, is that applying international law itself could be problematic. North Korea is a state
with limited recognition; South Korea considers North Korea to be a part of the same
nation and vice versa (Scofeld, 2005). Therefore, in theory, should an ofensive cyber
operation be proven to be North Korea’s doing, they would fall under Korean Criminal
Law. However,  in reality attempts to push South Korea’s criminal  law to North Korea
would more likely  be  detrimental.  Potential  solutions  and responses should be  found
within international law; even in cases without physical damages. 
4. South Korea Response
As shown in prior cases, the evidence found in major cyber attacks are weakly linked to
North Korea. While North Korea is certainly a prime suspect, many alternative hypotheses
are just  as  likely.  These alternatives,  however,  are not  politically  benefcial  for  South
Korea. A major concern about the South Korean situation is how predictable the initial
response is,  combined with no follow-through to any real  conclusion. For example, in
most attacks North Korea was confirmed by the government to be the attacker within a
week of the attack. Police and other investigations into the attack concluded weeks later,
fnding  similar  evidence  to  prior  attacks.  Related  attack  ‘traces’  are  now  publicly
available, and somewhat easily forged.
This situation presents a number of response challenges. First, other entities, such as
governments or organized crime could attack South Korea and attempt to make traces
similar to those presumed to be North Korean. Second, successful cyber attacks against
South Korea critical infrastructure is quite common. The government’s stance is that the
perpetrator is known, but the attacks continue to be successful. This demonstrates a lack
of ability or willingness to secure critical infrastructure and control a known adversary.
Finally,  a major point of the South Korean response regarding almost all  major cyber
attacks is little transparency. North Korea is blamed, the same weak evidence is given
and there is no further elaboration on methods, motives or prevention. The response, at
least publicly, appears to be nothing.
An analysis in the context of the Tallinn Manual appears to show why South Korea is
restricted in its response options. There are very few legal options for a country in South
Korea’s position. Ultimately, the issue is proper attribution, which is rarely possible but is
a  reality  in  cyber  warfare.  Without  this  attribution  being  unrealistically  certain,  most
recommendations about cyber warfare response cannot be applied.
5. Conclusions
This work gave an overview of major cyber attacks against South Korea. These attacks
work  normally  blamed  on  North  Korea  using  similar  evidential  traces  that  are
circumstantial. One attack that is presumed to be attributed to North Korea is used as a
basis for claiming another attack must defnitely be North Korea. The most recent attack
that  appears  to  be  an  act  of  cyber  warfare  was  against  the  South  Korean  Cyber
Command. We analyzed South Korea’s response options to this real attack in the context
of the Tallinn Manual, and found that South Korea has no military recourse, even from a
targeted attack that leaked confdential information, if that attack is no longer ongoing.
This partially explains South Korea’s lack of a substantive reaction during any of  the
major attacks that took place.
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